G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007. * EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent. G.R. No. 134029. February 6, 2007. * RODOLFO SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.

 Venue; In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals (74 SCRA 189 [1976]), we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining residence—as contradistinguished from domicile—of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of settlement of his estate.—Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province “in which he resides at the time of his death.” In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189 (1976), we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence—as contradistinguished from domicile —of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Same; For purpose of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his

legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.—It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that “residence,” for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.” The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between “residence” for purposes of election laws and “residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, “residence” and “domicile” are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another. Family Code; Marriages; The Court stated that “the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.”—This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989), where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that “the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.” Same; Same; Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.—When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. —Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Marriages; Co-ownership; Property; Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.—Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a coownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through 

their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.      Manuel O. Chan, Jr. for petitioner Edgar San Luis.      Ariel Vista for petitioner Rodolfo San Luis. Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondent. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.