G.R. No. 142021. November 29, 2000. * SPOUSES TEODORA and WLLFREDO BUENAFLOR, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, UNITED RURAL BANK OF PANAY ISLAND, INC., represented by its Manager Raul Balandra, and THE HONORABLE DANILO P. GALVEZ, Acting Presiding Judge of the Aklan Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan, respondents.

 Remedial Law; Appeals; Court has allowed the filing of an appeal in some cases where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, only when to do so would serve the demands of justice and in the exercise of the Court’s equity jurisdiction.— This Court has allowed the filing of an appeal in some cases where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, only when to do so would serve the demands of justice and in the exercise of the Court’s equity jurisdiction. This is based on the rule of liberality in the interpretation of the Rules to achieve substantial justice. It may be recalled that the general rule is that the Rules of Court are rules of procedure and whenever called for they should be so construed as to give effect rather than defeat their essence.

Same; Same; While the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied; Rules sometimes have been relaxed on equitable considerations.—Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that, while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The principal issue before this Court is whether or not the appellate docket fees were duly paid within the period of appeal. The appellate docket fees in this case in the form of two postal money orders were seasonably received by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court which rendered the judgment appealed from, but one was addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals and the other to the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court; by reason of which, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint for failure to pay the docket fees pursuant to Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

 s decision, which was received by petitioners on January 17, 1998, in favor of the respondent bank. On January 30, 1998, petitioners filed with the trial court a notice of appeal 1 with postal money orders attached thereto as payment of the appellate docket fees. Postal Money Order No. J 0374905 in the amount of P352.00 was written as payable to the Clerk, of Court of the Supreme Court, while Postal Money Order No. J 0374096 in the amount of P68.00 was payable to the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals. On February 26, 1998, counsel for petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion for Issuance of Formal Order, alleging therein that the Clerk of Court of the trial court returned petitioners’ postal money orders to said counsel without mentioning the reasons for

since the postal money orders were made payable to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and not the Clerk of Court of the trial court, such omission shall be considered as failure of the petitioners to pay the appellate docket fee within the period for taking an appeal. The trial court likewise denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners.

CA- abandoned

petition for certiorari wherein petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their appeal considering that the required docket fees were actually paid within the prescribed period, except that there was a minor error as to the payee thereof.

However, the question remains whether or not there was proper payment of the appellate docket fees. We believe so. The concept of payment should not be construed in the strict or technical sense. In its general sense, payment has been defined as a delivery or money or its equivalent in either specific property or services by one person from whom it is due to another person to whom it is due. 1 2 Delivery is the act by which the res or substance thereof is placed within the actual or constructive possession or control of another. 1 3

substantial performance of an obligation, there must have been an attempt in good faith to perform,

The postal money orders which were intended for the payment of the appellate docket fees were actually sent to the trial court. They were filed within the reglementary period and received by the trial court. The petitioners clearly intended to file an appeal. In the case at bar, the delivery of the appellate docket fees to the proper Clerk of Court should be interpreted to mean as the proper payment thereof or, at least, substantial performance of the obligation to pay the appellate docket fees. The fact that the postal money orders were addressed to the clerks of court of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, respectively, is a minor technicality, which if treated too rigidly would run counter to the spirit of the Rules and thwart the ends of justice. At worst, there is a mere defective payment which may be cured by a simple amendment of the notice of appeal. Considering the special circumstances of the case, it cannot be said, without running afoul with the ends of substantial justice, that there is a failure to pay the docket fees. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,

transmit the records to CA in accordance with Rule 41.