G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005. * NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA,” respondent.

 Actions; Human Relations; Torts and Damages; Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria; The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to a self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.— Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a “gate-crasher.” The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a

person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to selfinflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under 

obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Where the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, the Supreme Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to review such findings of facts.—The general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law. One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party. Same; Same; Same; Evidence; It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves.—Another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses —Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva—proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party. Same; Same; Same; Party Gatecrashers; A person who did not abuse her right in asking a person to leave a party to which he was not invited cannot be made to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.—Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil 

Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee. Same; Same; Same; Principle of Abuse of Rights; Article 19 of the Civil Code, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances, the object of the article being to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.—Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts 

and social grievances. Article 19 states: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Elsewhere, we explained that when “a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.” The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Same; Same; Same; Same; A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.—Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional. 

Same; Same; Same; Same; A complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.—As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being “single at 44 years old,” had a “very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen.” The lameness of this argument need not be

belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures. Same; Same; Same; Same; Bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.—The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action “predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity.” Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.