G.R. No. 156081. October 19, 2005. * FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT JOHN SOBREPEÑA, and RAFAEL PEREZ DE TAGLE, JR., petitioners, vs. WILSON GO, respondent.

Taxation; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not among the agencies enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43.—Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not among the agencies enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. We cannot agree with petitioners’ submission that a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasijudicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. 

Appeals; Since the Department of Justice is not a quasijudicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43.— Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ petition for review

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court dismissed the petition for review under Rule 43 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for being an erroneous mode of ap-peal from the Resolution 4 of the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary had modified the Resolution 5 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in I.S. No. PSG 00-04-10205 and directed the latter to file an information for estafa against petitioners.  

The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of FilEstate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). On October 17, 1995, FEPI allegedly entered into a Project Agreement with Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (MSDC), whereby FEPI undertook to develop several parcels of land in Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly owned by MSDC. U

Respondent Wilson Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38 from FEPI. Lot 17 measured approximately 1,079 square meters and the purchase price agreed upon was P4,304,000.

. In turn, FEPI would execute a final Deed of Sale in favor of Go and deliver to Go the owner’s duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) upon complete payment of the purchase price. 

Go fully complied with the terms of the Contract. FEPI, however, failed to develop the property.

 FEPI explained that the project was temporarily halted due to some claimants

who opposed FEPI’s application for exclusion of the subject properties from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)

cease and desist order issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).

Go then filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). He likewise filed a separate Complaint-Affidavit for estafa under Articles 316 6 

 Go alleged that the petitioners committed estafa when they offered the subject property for sale since they knew fully well that the development of the property and issuance of its corresponding title were impossible to accomplish, as the ownership and title thereto had not yet been acquired and registered under the name of FEPI at the time of sale. Thus, FEPI had grossly misrepresented itself as owner at the time of the sale of the subject property to him and when it received from him the full payment, despite being aware that it was not yet the owner.

The City Prosecutor found no misrepresentation

GO appealed before the DOJ which sided with Go 

The DOJ found that there was a prima facie basis to hold petitioners liable for estafa 

The appellate court opined that a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be availed of as a mode of appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of Justice because the Rule applies only to agencies or officers exercising quasi-judicial functions. The decision to file an information or not is an executive and not a quasi-judicial function. Herein petitioners seasonably moved for reconsideration, but the motion was likewise denied by the Court of Appeal

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RULE 43 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CANNOT BE AVAILED OF TO APPEAL THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.

To our mind, the sole issue for resolution is whether a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to file an information in a criminal case. In the course of this determination, we must also consider whether the conduct of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor is a quasijudicial function.

 Petitioners submit that there is jurisprudence to the effect that Rule 43 covers rulings of the Secretary of Justice since during preliminary investigations, the DOJ’s decisions are deemed as “awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions”, and its prosecutorial offices are considered quasi-judicial bodies/officers performing quasijudicial functions. Respondent counters that the herein petition is a dilatory tactic and emphasizes that “injunction will not lie to restrain criminal prosecution.”

Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ petition for review.

Notwithstanding that theirs is a petition for review properly under Rule 45, petitioners want us to reverse the findings of probable cause by the DOJ after their petition for review under Rule 43 from the court a quo failed. This much we are not inclined to do, for we have no basis to review the DOJ’s factual findings and its determination of probable cause. First, Rule 45 is explicit. This mode of appeal to the Supreme Court covers the judgments, orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or any authorized court and should raise only pure question of law. The Department of Justice is not a court. Also, in this petition are raised factual matters for our resolution, e.g. the ownership of the subject property, the existence of deceit committed by petitioners on respondent, and petitioners’ knowledge or direct participation in the Contract to Sell. These are factual issues and are outside the

Second, courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith, if he finds the charge insufficient in form or substance, or without any ground. Or, he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint in his view is sufficient and in proper form. 2 2 The decision whether to dismiss a complaint or not, is dependent upon the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. 2 3 Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion. 2 4 In this case, petitioners have not shown sufficient nor convincing reason for us to deviate from prevailing jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

 

Courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith, if he finds the charge insufficient in form or substance, or without any ground. Or, he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint in his view is sufficient and in proper form. The decision whether to dismiss a complaint or not, is dependent upon the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion. In this case, petitioners have not shown sufficient nor convincing reason for us to deviate from prevailing jurisprudence