G.R. No. 249011, March 15, 2021 ] CRISTITA ANABAN, CRISPINA ANABAN, PUREZA ANABAN, CRESENCIA ANABAN-WALANG, AND ROSITA ANABAN-BARISTO, PETITIONERS, VS. BETTY ANABAN-ALFILER, MERCEDES ANABAN, AND MARCELO ANABAN, RESPONDENTS.

ADVANCE DECISIONS: CRISTITA ANABAN, CRISPINA ANABAN, PUREZA ANABAN, CRESENCIA ANABAN-WALANG, and ROSITA ANABAN-BARISTO vs. BETTY ANABAN-ALFILER, MERCEDES ANABAN, and MARCELO ANABAN, March 15, 2021

 

Issue: WON Pedrito’s divorce claimed to have been decreed in accordance with the Ibaloi customs be recognized under our laws.

 

Facts: There was an action filed for the partition of Pedrito’s estate. In determining who should succeed to the estate, the court ruled on the validity of the subsequent marriage between Pedrito and Pepang. Backstory…

 

In 1942, Pedrito Anaban (Pedrito) and Virginia Erasmo (Virginia) got married in accordance with the native customs of the lbaloi Tribe to which they both belonged. They had three (3) children

 

In 194 7, however, the council of tribe elders took notice of Virginia's insanity and based thereon approved the couple's divorce and allowed Pedrito to remarry.4

 

In 1952, Pedrito got married to fellow lbaloi Pepang still in accordance with their tribe's customs. They begot eight (8) children –

 

Upon Pedrito's death on September 2, 2004, respondents sued for summary settlement or judicial partition of the intestate estate of their father Pedrito.6 They named as respondents their half-siblings,

 

Respondents averred that during the marriage of their father Pedrito to their mother Virginia, Pedrito acquired from his father Pedro Anaban a portion of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title. But the new certificate of title issued to Pedrito reflected that he was man-ied to petitioners' mother Pepang. Although in truth, his marriage with their mother Virginia was not yet legally dissolved. Thus, petitioners are actually the illegitimate children of their father Pedrito.

 

Petitioners, argued that they are the legitimate children of their father Pedrito with their mother Pepang. Pedrito and respondents' mother Virginia were man-ied in accordance with the Ibaloi Tribe customs and their man-iage was also dissolved in accordance with lbaloi tribe customs and traditions. Thereafter, Pedrito married their (petitioners') mother Pepang similarly in accord with the lbaloi customs. Since the celebration of man-iage pursuant to a tribe's customs was recognized under the Old Civil Code of the Philippines, then its dissolution in accordance with that tribe's customs must also be recognized. Thus, both the marriage and the subsequent divorce between Pedrito and Virginia are valid. Consequently, the man-iage of their parents must also be deemed valid.

 

 

Now before the court is a petition by Virgia’s children the marriage between Pedrito and Virginia was validly dissolved in accordance with the customs of the lbaloi tribe; and second, petitioners are the legitimate children of Pedri to

 

Ruling: Supreme Court ruled No, the divorce was not valid. The Old Civil Code took effect on June 18, 1949, which was 2 years after the divorce decree was purportedly handed down by the Ibaloi council of the elders. The law in effect prior was still the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Article 5 which states that Laws are abrogated only by other subsequent laws, and the disuse of any custom or practive to the contrary shall not prevail against their observance. This is equivalent of Article 11 of the old Civil Code which provides that customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.

 

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, divorce can be granted only on two grounds, i.e. adultery and concubinage. This was the prevailing law when Pedrito and Virginia got married in 1942. Act No. 2710 under the American regime was the prevailing law when Pedrito and Virginia were granted divorce by the Ibaloi council of elders in 1947. Act No. 2710 allowed divorce on the ground of concubinage and adultery.

 

in 1947, only two (2) grounds were accepted for divorce, i.e., adultery and concubinage. Neither was the reason for Pedrito and Virginia's divorce. The Ibaloi council of elders granted the divorce on ground of Virginia's alleged insanity. The divorce, therefore, is contrary to law, hence, cannot be recognized.

 

Doctrine: x

The Marriage  of Pedrito and Virginia was not legally dissolved. As a consequence, Pedri to' s subsequent marriage to Pepang was bigamous, thus, void from the beginning. The status of petitioners as illegitimate children of Pedrito and their heirship as such insofar as Pedrito's estate is concerned can no longer be questioned.

  

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated July 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 154216 affirming the nullity of the bigamous marriage between Pedrito Anaban (Pedrito) and Pepang Guilabo (Pepang) and petitioners Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban, Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo's status as illegitimate children of Pedrito and must inherit only as such.

Antecedents

In 1942, Pedrito Anaban (Pedrito) and Virginia Erasmo (Virginia) got married in accordance with the native customs of the Ibaloi Tribe to which they both belonged. They had three (3) children, i.e., respondents Betty Anaban-Alfiler, Mercedes Anaban, and Marcelo Anaban.3

In 1947, however, the council of tribe elders took notice of Virginia's insanity and based thereon approved the couple's divorce and allowed Pedrito to remarry.4

In 1952, Pedrito got married to fellow Ibaloi Pepang still in accordance with their tribe's customs. They begot eight (8) children – Lardi Anaban, Teodoro Anaban, Monina Anaban and respondents Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban, Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo.5

Upon Pedrito's death on September 2, 2004, respondents sued for summary settlement or judicial partition of the intestate estate of their father Pedrito.6 They named as respondents their half-siblings, petitioners Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban, Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo.

Respondents averred that during the marriage of their father Pedrito to their mother Virginia, Pedrito acquired from his father Pedro Anaban a portion of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-14574. But the new certificate of title issued to Pedrito reflected that he was married to petitioners' mother Pepang. Although in truth, his marriage with their mother Virginia was not yet legally dissolved. Thus, petitioners are actually the illegitimate children of their father Pedrito.7

Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that they are the legitimate children of their father Pedrito with their mother Pepang. Pedrito and respondents' mother Virginia were married in accordance with the Ibaloi Tribe customs and their marriage was also dissolved in accordance with Ibaloi tribe customs and traditions. Thereafter, Pedrito married their (petitioners') mother Pepang similarly in accord with the Ibaloi customs. Since the celebration of marriage pursuant to a tribe's customs was recognized under the Old Civil Code of the Philippines, then its dissolution in accordance with that tribe's customs must also be recognized. Thus, both the marriage and the subsequent divorce between Pedrito and Virginia are valid. Consequently, the marriage of their parents must also be deemed valid.8

Issue

Is Pedrito Anaban's divorce from Virginia Erasmo claimed to have been decreed in accordance with the Ibaloi customs be recognized under our laws?

Ruling

We answer in the negative.

At the threshold, we emphasize that the action below is for partition of Pedrito's estate. In determining who should succeed to the estate, the court may pass upon the validity of the subsequent marriage between Pedrito and Pepang. Thus, in De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro,28 the Court decreed:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. (Empahsis supplied)

Here, there is no dispute that Pedrito was first married to Virginia, although petitioners assert this marriage was later on validly dissolved by the divorce decree handed down by the Ibaloi council of elders which consequently allowed Pedrito to remarry.

The question now comes to fore: can the divorce granted under Ibaloi customs and practices be legally recognized as to make Pedrito's subsequent marriage to Pepang as valid.

All of the courts below resolved the validity of the so-called divorce between Pedrito and Virginia through the lens of the old Civil Code. But, in reality, when Pedrito and Virginia got married and even when they later on supposedly divorced, the old Civil Code was not yet in effect. For it took effect on June 18, 1949, or two (2) years after the divorce decree was purportedly handed down by the Ibaloi council of elders. The law in effect prior thereto was still the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Article 5 of which stated:29

Article 5. Laws are abrogated only by other subsequent laws, and the disuse or any custom or practice to the contrary shall not prevail against their observance. (Emphasis supplied)

This was the equivalent of Article 11 of the old Civil Code which provides that customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.

For purposes of determining whether divorce was contrary to law, public order or public policy at the time Pedrito and Virginia allegedly obtained their own divorce, we trace back the history of divorce or dissolution of marriage starting from the Spanish regime.

During the Spanish colonization, Las Siete Partidas was passed which only allowed relative divorce or what is known now as legal separation. This allowed spouses to be free of all marital obligations while their marriage subsists in the eyes of the law. In 1917, however, Las Siete Partidas was repealed by Act No. 271030 which took effect on March 11, 1917. Section 1 of Act No. 2710 reads:

Section 1. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband, committed in any of the forms described in article four hundred and thirty-seven of the Penal Code.

Divorce, then, can be granted only on two (2) grounds, i.e., adultery and concubinage. This was the prevailing law when Pedrito and Virginia got married in 1942. In 1943, however, during the Japanese occupation, Act No. 2710 was abolished and Executive Order No. 141 (EO 141) was enacted and took effect on March 25, 1943.

Under EO 141, absolute divorce may be granted on these grounds: (a) adultery and concubinage; (b) attempt on the life of one spouse by the other; (c) a subsequent marriage by either party before the previous one was dissolved; (d) loathsome contagious diseases contracted by either spouse; (e) incurable insanity; (f) impotency; (g) repeated bodily violence by one against the other; (h) intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year; (i) unexplained absence from the last conjugal abode continuously for at least three years; and (j) slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other.

Only a little over a year, however, after the Americans had taken over the Japanese as colonizers again of the Philippines, EO 141 became ineffective and Act No. 2710, which allowed divorce on ground of concubinage and adultery, was once again reinstated. This was the prevailing law when Pedrito and Virginia were granted divorce by the Ibaloi council of elders in 1947.

Thus, in 1947, only two (2) grounds were accepted for divorce, i.e., adultery and concubinage. Neither was the reason for Pedrito and Virginia's divorce. The Ibaloi council of elders granted the divorce on ground of Virginia's alleged insanity. The divorce, therefore, is contrary to law, hence, cannot be recognized.

The issue of whether divorce based on customs and practices can be legally recognized during the effectivity of Act No. 2710 has been resolved by the Court as early as 1933 in People v. Bitdu.31 The Court held that Mora Bitdu's divorce from Moro Halid in accordance with the Mohammedan customs cannot be recognized. For divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then only for those causes and with those formalities which the state has, by statute, prescribed. The Court explained:

There is little to add to the well considered decision of the trial judge. It seems to us unnecessary to determine whether or not the divorce in question was granted in accordance with the Mohammedan religious practices, as to which there seems to exist considerable uncertainty, because in our view of the case a valid divorce can be granted only by the courts and for the reasons specified in Act No. 2710. It is not claimed that the appellant was divorced from her first husband in accordance with said Act.

In the case of Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil., 42), it was held that in the Philippines the causes for divorce are prescribed by statute or Act No. 2710 that (of adultery on the part of the) wife or concubinage on the part of the husband.

In the recent decision of People vs. Bituanan (Moro), (56 Phil., 23), where the defendant and a Moro woman were married by a datu according to Moro customs and usages and afterwards divorced by the datu according to the same customs and usages, it was held that the marriage performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion was valid, and assumed, for the purpose of that case, that the defendant and his wife were not legally divorced.

Section 25 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613) provides that marriages between Mohammedans may be performed in accordance with the rites or practice of their religion, but there is no provision of law which authorizes the granting of divorces in accordance with the rites or practices of their religion.

A divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then only for those causes and with those formalities which the state has by statute prescribed (19 C.J., 19).

It is conceded in all jurisdictions that public policy, good morals, and the interests of society require that the marriage relation should be sounded with every safeguard and its severance allowed only in the manner prescribed and for the causes specified by law. And the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings (19 C.J., 20).

With respect to the contention that the appellant acted in good faith in contracting second marriage, believing that she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that is act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

As the trial court in Bitdu held, the laws governing marriage and its incidents are moral in nature and as such they are laws relating to public policy. The habits and customs of a people, the dogmas and doctrines of a religion cannot be superior to or have precedence over laws relating to public policy, because as stated above laws relating to marriage and its incidents are normal in nature and as such they affect public policy. This holds true even up to this time.

Since there was no legal and valid ground for the divorce of Pedrito and Virginia, in the eyes of the law, they were still married and their marriage was not dissolved as to permit Pedrito to remarry. Pedrito's subsequent marriage to petitioners' mother Pepang, therefore, is void for being bigamous. Verily, the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err when they ruled so and declared petitioners as Pedrito's illegitimate children.

Petitioners insists, however, that since the old Civil Code and the IPRA recognize customs in the solemnization of marriage, the same should be applied in cases of dissolution as marriage. But, as discussed, customs which are contrary to law, public policy and public order cannot be recognized.

Also, even assuming that the old Civil Code was applicable in the present case, the Court would arrive at the same conclusion. Article 78 of the old Civil Code provided:

Article 78. Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with Article 92.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Section 8, Rule 6 of the IRR of IPRA is similarly worded:

Section 8. Recognition of Customary Laws and Practices Governing Civil Relations. Marriage as an inviolable social institution shall be protected. Marriages performed in accordance with customary laws, rites, traditions and practices shall be recognized as valid. As proof of marriage, the testimony of authorized community elders or authorities of traditional sociopolitical structures shall be recognized as evidence of marriage for purposes of registration. x x x

Clearly, both the old Civil Code and the IPRA-IRR provisions limited the State recognition to "marriages performed" in accordance with customary laws, rites, traditions, and practices. There is no mention of the recognition of dissolution of marriage in accordance with the IP's customs.

On this score, we emphasize that Muslim customs, rites, and practices are the only non-Christian customary law recognized by the State through the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 1083 otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.32 The same in fact bears an entire chapter exclusively dedicated to divorce. Notably, its applicability clause states:

Article 13. Application.

(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.

At present, there is no similar law explicitly recognizing the matrimonial customs, rites, and practices of the Ibaloi Tribe.ℒαwρhi৷

Even if we are to assume that the constitutional and statutory right to cultural integrity includes recognition of indigenous divorce or any other form of indigenous dissolution of marriages, the record is bereft of evidence that: (i) the culture of the Ibaloi recognizes divorce or any other form of dissolution of marriage; (ii) this recognition is a central aspect of their cultural integrity and not merely peripheral to it; (iii) this recognition has been a central cultural practice since time immemorial and lasted to this day in its modern forms; and (iv) the contents of and procedures for this central cultural practice, if any.

The lead government agency for this determination – in the words of the learned counsel of the State, the proof of customary law as a fact – is the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. But nothing from their end could answer how, why, and when the dissolution of marriages is central to the right to cultural integrity and what it means to say so. It would, therefore, be speculative at this point to link this right to cultural integrity to the dissolution of marriages between members of the IP communities, sans any supporting evidence.

Lastly, petitioners invoke PSA's AO 3, series of 2004 governing the procedures and guidelines for civil registration of births, marriages, dissolution of marriages, and other civil concerns of the ICCs and IPs. According to petitioners, AO 3 defines dissolution of marriage among IPs as the termination of marriage per ruling of the council of elders for causes sanctioned by established customary law or practice after exhausting all possible means of reconciliation between the couple.

But, AO 3 only took effect in 2004, fifty-seven (57) years after the divorce was supposedly granted by the Ibaloi council of elders to Pedrito and Virginia. It cannot be applied retroactively, but only prospectively.

Besides, AO 3 is only a procedural avenue to recognize divorce or any other form of dissolution of marriage where the substantive law already recognizes such change in a person's civil status. AO 3 cannot confer substantive rights because the role of the PSA and now the National Statistics Office is to record the civil status of persons but not to issue laws on how to obtain or confer status.

All told, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in pronouncing that the marriage of Pedrito and Virginia was not legally dissolved. As a consequence, Pedrito's subsequent marriage to Pepang was bigamous, thus, void from the beginning. The status of petitioners as illegitimate children of Pedrito and their heirship as such insofar as Pedrito's estate is concerned can no longer be questioned.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 154216 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.