G.R. No. 81262. August 25, 1989. * GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.

 Torts and Damages; Human Relations; Labor Law; Dismissal; The employer is liable for damages to the employee if the dismissal is done abusively.—The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27, 1966, 18 SCRA 107]. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code. Same; Same; Malicious Prosecution; The right to institute criminal prosecutions cannot be exercised maliciously and in bad faith.—While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 587]. Hence, in Yutuk v. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And in Hawpia v. CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 536, the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney’s fees after making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent, all of which were dismissed

Same; Same; Same; Mere dismissal of a criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution in the

absence of competent evidence showing bad faith on the part of complainant.—To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30, 1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of a suit, by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 60]. Same; Same; Same; The fact that the 6 criminal cases were filed notwithstanding the police reports exculpating private respondent from the anomalies, and the eventual dismissal of all such criminal cases, lead to the conclusion that petitioner was motivated by malicious intent in filing the criminal cases.—In fine, considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias. Same; Same; Quasi Delict; The principle of damnum absque injuria does not apply in the instant case considering the abusive manner in which petitioner exercised its right to dismiss private respondent, and the several other quasi-delictual acts committed by the former.—According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a 

legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil. 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in

which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners. Same; Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; Award of exemplary damages is proper when the act performed is deliberate, malicious, and tainted with bad faith.—Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides that “[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence,” the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L-28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.