No. L-55960. November 24, 1988. * YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners, vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

 Civil Law; Custom; Definition of Custom; Custom must be proved as a fact according to the rules on evidence.—Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory." The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the

rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom. Same; Same; Marriages; To establish a valid foreign marriage, the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence must be proven.—Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact: and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage.—In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the 'foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws well-established. —Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).] This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours.—Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article

Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage.—In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the 'foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws well-established. —Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).] This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours.—Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article

deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood. Same; Same; Petitioners are also the acknowledged natural children of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego.—Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowledged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritence. PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.      Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners. De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for