Compendium - Persons

Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, December 29, 1986

 

Issue: WON the presidential decrees were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

 

Facts: There were a number of presidential decrees claimed to had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows: "ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication." Petitioners came before the Court to move for clarification as to when should the law take effect relative to their publication.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court held that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which was mandatory. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

 

Doctrine: Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or extended.

 

 

De Roy vs. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 757, January 29, 1988

 

Issue: WON the grace period still applies in the present case.

 

Facts: Petitioner De Roy owns a burned-out building which collapsed and caused the death of private respondent’s daughter. RTC found the petitioner guilty of gross negligence. This was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner filed a motion for extension to file a motion for consideration on the last day of the 15-day window to file an appeal. The CA denied the petitioners’ motions, anchoring on ruling in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises Inc. v. Japzon that the 15 day period for appeal or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. Hence, this petition before the Court.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court held that non-publication of the Habalayus decision in the Official Gazette at the time the decision of the CA was promulgated does not deter the applicability of the rule enunciated therein. There is no law requiring the publication of SC decision in the Official Gazette before they can be binding.

 

Doctrine: It is the duty of the lawyer to keep abreast of Court decisions as published in reports in G. R.s, SCRA and law journals.

 

People vs., Que Po Lay 94 Phil 640

 

Issue: WON Circular No. 20 is applicable, whereas it was not published as required by law.

 

Facts: Que Po Lay was found guilty of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank. Circular No. 20 imposes punishment for failure sell foreign exchange to the Central Bank through its agent within one day following the receipt of the foreign exchange. The Circular was issued in 1949, but it was not published until November 1951, 3 months after the decision was rendered to Que Po Lay.  Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette unless it is otherwise provided.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court acquit Que Po Lay rendering Circular No. 20 with no legal effect since it has not been published as required by law. The Circular is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance. It has the force and effect of a law according to settled jurisprudence. In the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation.

 

Doctrine: Laws which prescribe penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.

 

NPC v. Pinatubo Commercial, G.R. No. 176006, 26 March 2010.

 

Issue: WON NPC Circular No. 99-75 need not be published before it can take effect.

 

Facts: National Power Corporation (NPC) Circular No. 99-75 was a 1999 directive issued by the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the disposal of scrap aluminium conductor steel-reinforced to qualified bidders. Pinatubo Commercial, a denied bidder, filed a petition in the RTC for the annulment of the Circular and argued that it was unconstitutional as it violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution and it ran counter to the government policy of competitive public bidding. RTC favored Pinatubo on those grounds, adding that the Circular had not been published. Hence the petition by NPC.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the decision by the RTC. The Court ruled that the Circular need not be published because it iwas merely an internal rule or regulation addressed to NPC personnel involved in the bidding and award of scraps. The Court found that it did not affect the rights of the public in general or any person not involved in the bidding. If it in any way affect individual rights, it did so unintentionally.

 

Doctrine: Internal rule and regulation not purported to enforce or implement an existing law need not be published.

 

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers G.R. No. 180643 March 25, 2008

 

Issue: WON the Senate Rules governing its proceeding may be given continuing effect from one Congress to the next.

 

Facts: Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) was issued a contempt order for not attending a particular Senate hearing invoking executive privilege, as directed by Executive Secretary.  Section 136 of the Senate Rules states: “At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.”  However, the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries adopted by Senate states that “Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in the two (2) newspapers of general circulation.” The question then was raised before the Court whether to allow the Senate Committee to continue its proceedings after expiration of Congress.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court denied the Senate Committee’s Motion for Reconsideration to conduct the preceding. The Court held that all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the Rules are null and void IF that result in violation of the rights of witnesses considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.    

 

Doctrine: The Senate should be given room to interpret the duration of its effectivity from one Congress to the next. However the application of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries should not infringe the rights of the private parties.

 

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, 575 SCRA 170, December 23, 2008

 

Issue: WON the Senate Committee may be allowed to pursue the Senate investigation.

 

Facts: A Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Write of Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 179275 was filed before the Court, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry on the “Hello Garci” tape.   Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the “Senate of the House of Representatives... may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” Article 2 of the Civil code provides that “laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in the newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Respondent, House of Representative admitted in G.R. No. 179275. that no effort was undertaken for the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation when they first opened the session. Hence this petition before the court.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court granted G.R. No. 179275. The Court held that the Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of investigation of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure. This requirement is to satisfy the basic requirement of due process. 

 

Doctrine: Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he has no notice whatsoever.

 

 

Pimentel, Jr. vs. Senate Committee of the Whole, 644 SCRA 741, March 08, 2011

 

Issue: WON the complaint may be referred to the Senate Committee of the Whole following the Rules of the Senate Committee.

 

Facts: Petitioner Pimentel et. al., filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order to enjoin the respondent, Senate Committee of the Whole from conducting further hearings on the complained filed surrounding the dispute on 2008 General Appropriations Act. Petitioners objected on the application of the Rules of Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole, particularly on the determination of quorum where three amendments were adopted. Petitioner raised the issue on the need to publish the proposed amended Rules. Respondent declared that there was substantial evidence to proceed with the adjudicatory hearing thus petitioners case to the Court for relief on the ground the referral of the complaint by the Committee on Ethics to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of the constitutional right to due process.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court grant the petition in part.  The referral of the complaint by the Committee on Ethics shall take effect only upon publication. The Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before it can take effect. Thus, even if the publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rule expressly mandate their publication.

 

Doctrine: Congress has the right to amend its own rules as long as there is observance of quorum, voting and publication when required.

 

Valeroso vs. People, 546 SCRA 450, February 22, 2008

 

Issue: WON Court of Appeals imposes the correct penalty on the case.

 

Facts: Petitioner Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 which was the governing law at the time the offense was committed. R.A. No. 8294 amended PD No. 1866 during the pendency of the case with the trial court. The penalty then changed to an additional fine of P15,000  imposed and a lowered imprisonment to prision correccional in its maximum period. Hoping for a better judgement, Valeroso filed a petition before the Court.  

 

Ruling: Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application unless favorable to the accused. The court held that the CA applied the correct penalty following the retroactive applicability of RA 8294.

 

Doctrine: Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward and never backward. However, a new law law may have retroactive effect if the penal law favors the guilty person who is not a habitual criminal.

 

Philippine National Bank vs. Office of the President, 252 SCRA 5, January 18, 1996

 

Issue: WON PD 957 is applicable to the mortgage contract, the contract having been executed prior the enactment of the law.

 

Facts: Petitioner Philippine National Bank provided a loan to the subdivision developer who mortgaged the subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. Subsequent defaulting of the developers led PNB to foreclose on the mortgage. PNB, as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, became the new owner of the subdivision lots. Pursuant to Section 18 of PD 957, a mortgagee bank is obliged to accept payment by the lot buyer of the remaining amortization to apply the payment to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness. Court of Appeals held the real estate mortgage null and void based on applicable law on PD 957. Hence the petition before the Court. 

 

Ruling: Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court finds that PD 957 was intended to cover mortgages that were executed prior to its enactment. The intent, captured in the preamble must be given effect if the obvious purpose is to protect the innocent purchasers. Although PD 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity, the intent of the law was to favor the weak and therefore must be applied retroactively to achieve the ends of social justice.

 

Doctrine: The intent of the status is the law.

 

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., 522 SCRA 131, April 24, 2007

 

Issue: WON VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting respondent from paying its VAT liabilities has retroactive application.

 

Facts: Respondent, Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc, wrote the petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) inquiring whether the services it provides are exempt from the payment of VAT. CIR confirmed that the corporation is exempt under VAT Ruling No. 231-88. Many years after, RA No. 7716 of the Expanded VAT Law took effect. CIR demanded payment of deficiency VAT however respondent did not take action. The case went to Court and CTA finally held that the corporation is VAT exempt. CA affirmed, hence the petition before the court.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court denied the petition. Section 246 of the 1997 Tax Code provides that ruling, circulars, rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no retroactive application if to apply them would prejudice the taxpayer. The exceptions to this rule are: 1. Where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return, where the facts gathered by the BIR are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based, or where the taxpayer acter in bad faith. The Court held that applying the E-VAT Law retroactively would be prejudicial to the respondent.

 

 

Doctrine: Commission of Internal Revenue is precluded from adopting a position contrary to one previously taken where injustice would result to the taxpayer.

 

DM. Consunji, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 357 SCRA 249, April 20, 2001

 

Issue: WON the award of damages may be given to the widow.

 

Facts: A widow filed a complaint for damages against her husband’s employer, D. M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised the argument that the widow had previously availed the benefits provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer damages under the Civil Code. RTC rendered the decision in favor of the widow. The same was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence the petition before the Court.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court remanded the case to the RTC to determine whether the award decreed in it decision is more than that of the Employment Compensation Commission (ECC) /DOLE. Payment already made to the widow pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. The Court held that, the application of Article 3 of the Civil Code: ignorance of the law excuses no one --  is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. The widow’s ignorance of how her husband died and the remedies available to her to claim before the ECC cannot be held against her.

 

Doctrine: The claimant, by his choice of one remedy is deemed to have waived the other.

 

Cui vs. Arellano University, 2 SCRA 205, May 30, 1961

 

Issue: WON the petitioner may transfer to another school without refunding the scholarship cash.

 

Facts: Petitioner Cui was a law student at respondent Arellano University. Before the school awarded Cui the scholarship grant, he was made to sign a contract which promised that in consideration of the scholarship granted by the University, he waive the right to transfer to another school without refunding to the University the equivalent scholarship cash. Petitioner transferred to another school in his last year of law school. Petitioner was forced to refund the scholarship fund to be able to secure TOR from the University as requirement for the bar exam. The lower court recognized the validity of such contract hence this petition before the Court.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court ruled to reverse the decision and ordered the school to pay the Cui the scholarship money with interest. It held that the contract was a direct violation of freedom and was repugnant to sound morality and civic honestly and therefore void.

 

Doctrine: Scholarships are awarded in recognition of the potential of a student in whom society has established interest. Scholarships are not intended to keep students in school to bolster prestige.

 

Mecano vs. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 500, December 11, 1992

 

Issue: WON the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

 

Facts: Petitioner Mercano sought to nullify the Commission on Audit (COA) decision denying his claim for reimbursement under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC). Petitioner was hospitalized and had incurred medical and hospitalization expenses which he was claiming from COA. However, during that time, Administrative Code of 1987 took effect which was argued to have repealed the RAC. The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court, hence this petition.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered the respondent to give due recourse to petitioner’s claim for benefits. The Court held that the intent of the new Code was not to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. The Court did not find any irreconcilable conflict on the matter of subject claim. Repeal by application is not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature us presumed to know the existing laws and not have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.

 

Doctrine: The question on whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent.

 

People vs. Licera, 65 SCRA 270, July 22, 1975

 

Issue: WON the Macarandang rule applies in this case.

 

Facts: Licera was charged with illegal possession of rifle in 1965. IN 1966, the MTC rendered Licera guilty, affirmed by the Court of First Instance in 1968. Licera appealed to the Court of Appeals. He invoked that pursuant to People vs Macarandang, Macarandang was exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms being a “peace officer”. He alleges that the later case on People vs Mapa provided no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses. In 1974 the case reached the high court.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court acquitted Licera. The Court held that at the time of Licera’s designation as secret agent in 1961, and at the time of his apprehension for possession of the rifle without license or permit in 1965, the Macarandang rule i.e., the Court’s interpretation of Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code, formed part of the jurisprudence. Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. The Court ruled that the new rule in 1967 should operate prospectively and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule especially those who acted in good faith.

 

Doctrine: The Doctrine of Precedent: Stare decisis  or “to stand by things decided” – The Court interpretation of law has the effect of law. Article 8 of the Civil Code decreed that the judicial decision applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws means.

 

Chu Jan vs. Bernas., 34 Phil., 631, August 01, 1916

 

Issue: WON the lower court was correct in dismissing the case.

 

Facts: Plaintiff Chu Jan brought suit against the defendant having lost a bet during a cockfight. The lower court dismissed the case because the judge “is not familiar with ruled governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof and that he does not know where to find the law on the subject and finally that he knows of no law whatever that governs the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant in question concerning cockfights.”

 

Ruling: The Court remanded the case to the lower court for trial. The Court held that not knowing where to find the law applicable to the case, among other ignorance are not reasons that can excuse the court from terminating the procedure and dropping the issue. Article 6 of the Civil Code provides that the custom of the place shall be observed and, in the absence, therefore the general principles of law.

 

Doctrine: Ignorance of the special law applicable to a case does not justify the court in terminating the proceeding by dismissing it without decision.

 

People vs. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, November 20, 1978

 

Issue: WON the Informations filed by the People sufficient to constitute the offense of “illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under PD No. 9

 

Facts: Twenty six (26) Petitions for Review were filed by the People. These Petitions are appeals involving three Courts of First Instance. Informations were filed before these courts – the accuses being charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon. The Informations were dismissed for not alleging the facts which constitute the offence, particularly the essential element of the crime. To constitute a violation of PD 9, these two elements must be present: carrying the weapon outside one’s residence and carrying the weapn to abet, or subversion, lawless violence, chaos, etc.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court denied the petitions. The acts penalized in PD 9 are those related to the desired result of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders No. 6 and 7 which refer to firearms and therefore have no connection to PD 9 Paragraph 3 which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. The Court said that it is only the act of carrying the weapon with a motivation related with the desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of PD 9 – nothing else.

 

Doctrine: Penal laws are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.

 

Arreza vs. Toyo, 906 SCRA 588, July 01, 2019

 

Issue: WON the evidence provided is sufficient to grant the petition.

 

Facts: Petitioner Arreza filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry. The documents presented includes copy of Divorce Certificate, Tetsushi’s Family Register, Certificate of Acceptance of the Natification of Divorce and English translation of the Civil Code of Japan, among others. RTC denied the petition citing that petitioner failed to prove the copy of the Japan Law, having only provided an unauthenticated copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its English translation. Hence this petition.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals to determine and resolve the factual issues surrounding the alien spouse’s national law. The Court held that a divorce decree obtained overseas is considered a foreign judgement and hence if pleaded before the court, must be proved and its legal effects may be extended to the Filipino spouse.

 

Doctrine: The Court do not take judicial notice of foreign judgements and law. These shall be proven as facts to show the effect of the judgement on the alien party.

 

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Alvarez, 718 SCRA 54, March 05, 2014

 

Issue: WON the search warrants are valid and constitutional.

 

Facts: A Complaint was filed against respondent Alvarez who was alleged to have engaged in a form of network fraud known as International Simple Resal (ISR). ISR is a method of routing and completing international long distance call using the domestic exchange facilities. The Judge found probably cause for the issuance of the search warrants. Respondents files with the RTC a motion to quash the search warrants; one of the grounds was no probable cause for the crime of theft. CA quashed the warrants on the ground that the warrants were issued for “non-existent crimes.” With the denial of the motion, PLDT went to the Court under Rule 45 petition.   

 

Ruling: Supreme Court partially granted the petition. The Court highlight the principle of stare decisis which enjoins the adherence by the lower courts to rules established in the Court in its final decision. In applying the Laurel En Banc case, despite PLDT’s statement that the case is still pending motion for reconsideration, the CA erred in refusing to consider its ruling. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of persons to be free from unreasonable seizures. No search warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause.

 

 

Doctrine: The warrant may be quashed if the offense for which the warrant was issued was subsequently decriminalized during the pendency of the petition.

 

Ayala Corporation vs. Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corp., 346 SCRA 663, December 01, 2000

 

Issue: WON Ayala may be barred from enforcing the deed of restriction.

 

Facts: Petitioner Ayala Corporation, was the registered owner of a parcel of land which was sold with Special Condition of Sale (SCS) and Deed of Restrictions (DR). Respondent Rosa-Diana Realty proposed to construct a condominium but did not comply with the requirements in the DR which led to the petitioner filing a case praying that respondent either comply with the requirements or have the deed of sale rescinded.  CA rendered the decision in GR CV No. 4598 where it affirmed the decision of the lower court in favor of respondent Rosa-Diana Realty for the construction of the condominium. The decision relied on the doctrine of the law of the case in CA GR SP No 29157 which holds the ruling that Ayala is barred from enforcing the deed restrictions in dispute. Hence before the court is Ayala’s petition for the review seeking reversal of the CA decision.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court set aside the CA decision. Ayala is not barred from enforcing the deed of restriction. The Court held that the doctrine of the law of the case or stare decisis cannot be held to be applicable in this case because the only issue presented before CA was on the propriety of the annotation of the lis pendens (suit pending). The CA’s pronouncement that Ayala is barred from enforcing the deed of restrictions can only be considered as obiter dicta or an opinion that is not binding. This therefore may not be the basis of the CA decision since a dictum is not legally binding as a precedent.  

 

Doctrine: A dictum is an opinion of a judge which does not embody the resolution or determination of the court. A dictum is not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis.

 

ADVANCE DECISIONS: CRISTITA ANABAN, CRISPINA ANABAN, PUREZA ANABAN, CRESENCIA ANABAN-WALANG, and ROSITA ANABAN-BARISTO vs. BETTY ANABAN-ALFILER, MERCEDES ANABAN, and MARCELO ANABAN, March 15, 2021

 

Issue: WON Pedrito’s divorce claimed to have been decreed in accordance with the Ibaloi customs be recognized under our laws.

 

Facts: In 1942, Pedrito Anaban (Pedrito) and Virginia Erasmo (Virginia) got married in accordance with the native customs of the lbaloi Tribe to which they both belonged. They had three (3) children. In 1947, however, the council of tribe elders took notice of Virginia's insanity and based thereon approved the couple's divorce and allowed Pedrito to remarry. In 1952, Pedrito got married to fellow lbaloi Pepang still in accordance with their tribe's customs. They begot eight (8) children. Upon Pedrito's death on September 2, 2004, respondents sued for summary settlement or judicial partition of the intestate estate of their father Pedrito.

 

Ruling: Supreme Court ruled No, the divorce was not valid. The Old Civil Code took effect on June 18, 1949, which was 2 years after the divorce decree was purportedly handed down by the Ibaloi council of the elders. The law in effect prior was still the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Article 5 which states that Laws are abrogated only by other subsequent laws, and the disuse of any custom or practive to the contrary shall not prevail against their observance. This is equivalent of Article 11 of the old Civil Code which provides that customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.

 

Doctrine: The Marriage of Pedrito and Virginia was not legally dissolved. As a consequence, Pedrito' s subsequent marriage to Pepang was bigamous, thus, void from the beginning. The status of petitioners as illegitimate children of Pedrito and their heirship as such insofar as Pedrito's estate is concerned can no longer be questioned.

Martinez vs. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil 79 (1910)

 

Issue: WON there is negligence in leaving a kalesa to unload goods

 

Fact:  September 11, 1908 Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata in Ermita when a delivery wagon owned by Van Buskirk came along the street in the opposite direction ran into the carromata and overturned it. Severely wounding Martinez.

Van Buskirk presented that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; and that for the purpose of delivery, the cochero driving the team as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran up the street and collided with the kalesa.

 

Ruling: The Court held no, there was no negligence on leaving a kalesa to unload goods. It is usual for a coachman or driver, to leave his team when he assist to unloading the wagon. The coachman had driven the horses composing his team for a considerable time, during which the animals had shown no disposition to become unruly. To leave teams under similar circumstances and to assist in unloading the wagon, is the custom of drivers in the city and that the custom is sanctioned by employers.

 

Doctrine: This act of leaving the team to assist in the unloading was not proven destructive or injurious and which have been generally accepted in by society for so long a time as to have ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be unreasonable or imprudent.

Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales, G.R. No. 55960, November 24, 1988

 

Issue: WON the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and-custom was conclusively proven.

 

Facts: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died leaving behind properties. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of alleging among others that (a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee’s side alleging that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19,1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat. The probate court appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratix of the estate.

 

Ruling: The Court held that a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao (wife) and Gan Ching (younger brother of Yao) cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter.

 

Doctrine: For failure to prove the 'foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours.

CIR vs. Primetown, G.R. 162155, August 28, 2007

 

Issue: WON the petition was filed within the reglementary period of appeal.

 

Facts:  On March 11, 1999, Yap, vice chair of Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax Primetown paid in 1997. In Yap’s letter to petitioner revenue district officer Parcero of (BIR), he explained that the increase in the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused the real estate industry to slowdown. As a consequence, while business was good during the first quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses on that year. According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes. Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR. Therefore, Primetown was entitled to tax refund or tax credit. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Santos required Primetown to submit additional documents to support its claim.

 

Ruling: SC held that the petition was filed within the reglementary period. The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return. To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008. The Court therefore hold that respondent’s petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed on time.

 

Doctrine: Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.

 

Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139, October 08, 1985

 

Issue: WON the law recognize the divorce perfected

 

Facts: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.  June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that Alice's business in Ermita is conjugal property and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11,1982.

 

Ruling: The SC held that absolute divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines if valid under the national law of such an alien. Citing the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

 

Doctrine: Article 15 – Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653, June 30, 1989

 

Issue: WON the complaints for adultery have merits.

 

Facts: On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding in Germany. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC, on January 23, 1983. On January 15, 1986, Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner “had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

 

Ruling: The Court held the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country is admitted and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

 

Doctrine: The person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint. Private respondent being no longer the husband of petitioner has no legal standing to commence the adultery case.

San Luis vs. San Luis, 514 SCRA 294, February 06, 2007

 

Issue: WON Felicidad has legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

 

Facts:  The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel.  On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, however, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for divorce before the Family Court of Hawaii which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer in the U.S.A. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before RTC.

 

Ruling:  The Court find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

The Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that “the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.”

 

Doctrine: Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.

MARY ELIZABETH MERCADO, petitioner, vs. RENE V. ONGPIN, respondent.

 

Issue: WON damages and fees may be awarded to the petitioner.

 

Facts: The case involves a petition for the declaration of nullity of a marriage between Mary Elizabeth Mercado and Rene Ongpin. Ongpin had previously been married to Alma Mantaring, but believe that their marriage had been dissolved through a divorce decree obtained in the United States. Mantaring was still a Filipino citizen at the time of the divorce. Mercado argued that their marriage was valid until under Article 26 of the Family Code as she was United States citizen at the time. The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and void and awarded Mercado moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fee. On appeal. The Court of Appeals deleted the award of damages and fees Mercado filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the findings of the trial court.

 

Ruling: No, mere contracting of a second marriage despite the existence of a first marriage is not, by itself, a ground for damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 20 or Article 21. As correctly stressed by the Court of Appeals, the bad faith, or deliberate intent to do a wrongful act, of the bigamous spouse must be established: Here, it was not convincingly shown that appellant deliberately contracted a second marriage despite knowledge of the subsistence of his first marriage. He believed in good faith that the divorce decree given to his first wife was valid and binding in the Philippines because he thought all along that his first wife at that time was already an American citizen.

 

Doctrine: Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.

ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC., petitioners, vs. ERNESTO QUIAMCO, respondent.

Issue: WON petitioners’ acts violated the law which is against the proper norms of human relations.

 

Facts: Ernesto C. Quiamco, the person being accused in this case, was approached by Davalan, Gabutero, and Generoso to settle the civil aspect of a robbery case that Quiamco had filed against them. The robbery case was related to a motorcycle that had been sold to Gabutero on an installment basis by the petitioner, Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., which is a family-owned corporation managed by the petitioner. Davalan eventually stopped paying the remaining installments and informed the petitioner corporation's collector that the motorcycle had allegedly been taken by Quiamco's associates. Subsequently, the petitioner, accompanied by the police, attempted to recover the motorcycle and repeatedly saying, "Quiamco is a motorcycle thief." In retaliation, Quiamco filed a legal action seeking damages against the petitioners. He aimed to hold the petitioners accountable for the actions that had caused him humiliation, embarrassment, and damage to his reputation and integrity.

 

Ruling: Yes. SC upheld the “principle of abuse of right” which prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides: Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Here, liability attaches because of the abuse of the exercise of the right as the manner to recover the motorcycle was unduly harsh.

 

Doctrine: Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are the underlying principles of law and order in society.

 

 

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

Issue: WON a person may be liable for a breach of promise to marry.

 

Facts: Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez planned to marry on September 4, 1954, and made various preparations, such as obtaining a marriage license, sending out invitations, buying wedding attire, and arranging for gifts and bridal showers. However, just two days before the wedding, Velez abruptly left a note postponing the wedding due to his mother's opposition. On September 3, he sent a telegram reassuring Wassmer of his return, but he disappeared afterward. Wassmer sued Velez for damages and won by default. Velez later filed a petition for relief and a motion for a new trial, which he lost. He then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that there's no provision in the Civil Code for a breach of promise to marry.

 

Ruling: Yes. SC held that ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which the erring promissor must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil Code.

 

Doctrine: Article 21 of the New Civil Code states Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

 

JHONNA GUEVARRA ET AL., petitioner vs. JAN BANCH, respondent.

 

Issue: WON the return of P500,000 is proper to compensate the breach of promise to marry.

 

Facts: Banach, a German, accused Guevarra of deceiving him by professing her love and intention to marry him to obtain money, only to break up once she had received it. Banach took legal action to recover the P500,000 he had given her for their supposed marital home, alleging fraud or unjust enrichment. Guevarra, in turn, called off the engagement after discovering Banach's deceitful actions, including his false claim of being divorced when he was still married to his third wife. He also concealed his true identity from her. These revelations justified the cancellation of the wedding.

 

Ruling: No. SC held that a mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, as long as it is not of such extent as would palpably and unjustifiably contradict good customs. In any case, the party seeking to recover damages must have acted in good faith. Here, SC refused to award moral damages to Banach because he failed to proved that Guevarra acted with fraud and deceit. The P500,000 was a gift given to Guevarra. Guevarra’s change of heart was understandable upon learning of Banach’s misrepresentation. Therefore, reimbursement of the P500,000 is not proper for the marriage that did not materialized.

 

Doctrine: "Litigation for the heartbreak and broken promises must be discouraged." – Justice Leonen

 

 

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA,” respondent.

Issue: WON Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes to leave the party where he was not invited.

 

Facts: In February 2005, Roberto Reyes (also known as Amay Bisaya) filed a lawsuit for damages against the petitioners under Articles 19 and 21. He claimed that he had been wronged when he attended a birthday party at Hotel Nikko on October 13, 1994, upon an invitation from his friend, Dr. Violeta Filart. However, he was publicly asked to leave the party by Ruby Lim, the hotel's Executive Secretary, and escorted out by a Makati policeman. Filart disassociated herself from inviting Reyes to the party and asserted that he volunteered to carry her gift basket. The trial court dismissed Reyes' complaint, but the Court of Appeals overturned the decision. The petitioners argued that they should not be held liable for damages because Reyes willingly accepted the risk of being asked to leave the party as an uninvited guest, based on the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria.

 

Ruling:  No, SC held that Ruby Lim did not abuse her right in asking a person to leave a party to which he was not invited and that Ms. Lim cannot be made to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. As formulated by petitioners, the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria does not apply in this case because respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to

a self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.

 

Doctrine:  Article 19 is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances, the object of the article being to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.

 

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

Issue: WON a breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong

 

Facts: Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22-year-old Filipino with a good reputation in her community, filed a complaint against Gashem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian exchange student studying medicine at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. The complaint was for damages due to Baksh's violation of their agreement to marry. Before filing the complaint, Baksh courted Marilou and proposed marriage. She accepted, with the understanding that they would marry at the end of the semester in October. However, shortly after, Baksh coerced Marilou into living with him. After a few weeks, Baksh began mistreating her, causing injuries. A confrontation with the barangay captain of Guilig followed, during which Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement, claiming he was already married to someone else in Bacolod City. The lower court invoked Article 21 of the New Civil Code in favor of Marilou Gonzales. The court ordered Gashem Baksh to pay damages and fees.

 

Ruling: SC held that the existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21.

 

Doctrine: Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

CECILIO PE, ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.

Issue: WON Alfonso committed injury to Lolita’s family

 

Facts: The plaintiffs in this case are the family members of Lolita Pe, an unmarried 24-year-old woman. The defendant, Alfonso Pe, who is married, became close to the plaintiffs due to their shared family name, and they considered him a part of their family. Alfonso frequently visited Lolita's home, ostensibly to learn how to pray the rosary from her. However, their relationship evolved into a secret romantic affair. When rumors of their illicit relationship reached Lolita's parents, they forbade Alfonso from visiting their home and seeing Lolita. Despite this, Alfonso continued the relationship until Lolita disappeared from her parents' home. In response, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking moral, compensatory, exemplary, and corrective damages. The defendant argued that even if the alleged facts were true, they did not constitute a valid cause of action.

 

Ruling: Yes, SC held that the wrong defendant has caused Lolita and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Defendant won Lolita's affection thru an ingenious scheme or trickery and seduced her to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family defendant was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.

 

Doctrine: Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.

Issue: WON Globe Mackay are liable for damages to Tobias

 

Facts: Private respondent Tobias worked for petitioner GLOBE MACKAY. During his employment, he uncovered alleged irregularities within the company, such as fictitious purchases and fraudulent transactions. Upon discovery, Hendry, the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY, accused Tobias of being the main suspect. After returning from his forced leave, Tobias face a total six criminal complaints from GLOBE Mackay. However, police investigators cleared Tobias of any wrongdoing, and the criminal complaints filed against him for estafa were dismissed by the fiscal. Tobias then attempted to secure employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, Hendry, without being prompted by RETELCO, sent a letter to the company stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Subsequently, Tobias filed a civil case for damages against the petitioners, alleging unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive actions on their part.

 

Ruling:  SC held that that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights, the right to institute criminal prosecutions cannot be exercised maliciously and in bad faith. Past decisions by the court upheld judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney’s fees after making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent, all of which were dismissed.

 

Doctrine: The right to institute criminal prosecutions cannot be exercised maliciously and in bad faith.

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, vs. ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.

Issue: WON UE is liable for damages for misleading a student to believe that he has satisfied the requirements for graduation

 

Facts: Respondent Romeo Jader filed a lawsuit against petitioner UE, seeking damages for the emotional distress, mental anguish, severe anxiety, damage to his reputation, emotional suffering, and sleepless nights he endured due to his inability to take the 1988 bar examinations caused by UE's negligence. Jader claimed that he received an incomplete grade in Practice Court 1 and took a makeup exam, but he was informed too late that he had received a failing grade of 5. Jader attended the ceremony, participated in various celebratory activities, took a leave of absence from work, and even enrolled in a pre-bar review class. In response, UE denied any liability, arguing that it had not given Jader any reason to believe he had fulfilled the requirements for an LLB degree when his name appeared on the tentative list of graduating students.

 

Ruling: Yes, SC held that it is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate. Prior or subsequent to the graduation ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any problem involving the latter’s grades and performance and also most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same.

 

Doctrine: It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate.

 

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

 

Issue: WON Tenchaves is entitled to moral damages

 

Facts: Tenchavez filed a lawsuit in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Vicenta and her parents, accusing them of dissuading Vicenta from being with him and causing her to lose her affection for him. He also sued the Roman Catholic Church for annulling their marriage. He sought legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta argued that she had a valid divorce from Tenchavez and a valid marriage to her American husband. Her parents counterclaimed for moral damages, denying any involvement in their daughter's actions. The trial court did not grant legal separation but released Tenchavez from his obligation to support Vicenta and allowed him to acquire property separately. Tenchavez appealed directly to the Supreme Court for 1 million pesos in moral damage.

 

Ruling: Yes, SC held that Tenchavez is entitles to moral damageshowever, the one million pesos damages is unreasonable. First, the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on his part. Second, the parties never lived together. Third, there is evidence that Tenchavez had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy. Fourth, the fact that Tenchavez is unable to remarry under our law is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that he entered into voluntarily and with open eyes. Therefore, he should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney’s fees.

 

Doctrine: Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends.

ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL, respondents.

Issue: WON Dr. Aramil is entitled to moral damages

 

Facts: St. Louis Realty published an advertisement in the Sunday Times on December 15, 1968, and again on January 5, 1969, under the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS," featuring the name of Arcadio S. Arcadio with permission but without the consent of Dr. Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and UERM Medical Center faculty member. Dr. Aramil noticed the mistake, sent a protest letter, and demanded damages of P110,000, but no rectification or apology was issued. Dr. Aramil filed a complaint for damages against St. Louis Realty, alleging that the company failed to rectify the error promptly. Hence, this case before the Court.

 

Ruling: Yes, SC held that St. Louis Realty’s employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mixup. It just contented itself with a cavalier “rectification”. Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.

Doctrine: Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence

 

ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., and EMMA J. DATUIN, respondents.

Issue: WON there is malicious prosecution

 

Facts: Zenaida R. Gregorio, the proprietor of Alvi Marketing, was accused of violating the Bouncing Checks Law relating the purchases from Sansio. An Affidavit of Desistance by Datuin stated that Gregorio was not among the signatories of the bounced checks. Subsequently, the court dismissed the B.P. Blg. 22 cases. Gregorio then filed a damages lawsuit against Sansio and Datuin, asserting that she had suffered immeasurable harm due to their reckless disregard for the legal principle that mandates respect for the dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of mind of others. Sansio and Datuin sought to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it failed to state a cause of action for damages arising from malicious prosecution.

 

Ruling: No, SC held that Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist that Gregorio’s complaint is based on malicious prosecution. In an action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and established that Sansio and Datuin were impelled by legal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating an action against Gregorio, knowing that the charges were false and groundless, intending to vex and humiliate her. Gregorio did not allege this in her complaint. Moreover, the fact that she prayed for moral damages did not change the nature of her action based on quasi-delict. She might have acted on the mistaken notion that she was entitled to moral damages, considering that she suffered physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation on account of her indictment and her sudden arrest.

Doctrine: In an action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and established that the defendant was impelled by legal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating an action against the plaintiff.

 

LUISITO G. PULIDO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

 

Issue: WON subsequent declaration of the nullity of the first and second marriages constitutes a valid defense in bigamy.

 

Facts: Pulido and Rowena U. Baleda faced bigamy charges. Pulido had initially married Nora S. Arcon in 1983 and had a child with her in 1984. In 2007, Pulido admitted to having an affair with Baleda and stopped going home to his family. Pulido and Baleda got married in 1995, falsely indicating Pulido's civil status as single. In 2007, Arcon filed bigamy charges against them. Pulido argued that both of his marriages were null and void, while Baleda claimed she only learned of Pulido's prior marriage in April 2007 and subsequently filed a petition to annul her marriage to Pulido. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared their marriage null and void due to bigamy. The RTC convicted Pulido of bigamy but acquitted Baleda. The RTC also rejected Pulido's claim that both his marriages were void and upheld the validity of his marriage to Arcon.

 

Ruling: No, SC held that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or second marriages presented by the accused in the prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which they are secured. Being inexistent under the eyes of the law, the nullity of a void marriage can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the spouses.

 

Doctrine: A void marriage is ipso facto void without need of any judicial declaration of nullity.

 

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., petitioner, vs. SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M. MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE and ANTONIO V. AGCAOILI, respondents.

Issue: WON the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question.

 

Facts: Petitioner San Miguel Properties (SMP) purchased 130 residential lots in a BF Homes subdivision in Parañaque from BF Homes Inc. However, 20 of the 40 Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were not delivered by BF. Despite SMP's demands, BF Homes refused to hand over the TCTs. As a result, SMP filed a complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor (OCP), charging BF Homes with non-delivery of titles, which violated PD No. 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree). Concurrently, SMP sued BF Homes for specific performance at the HLURB, seeking to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs. The OCP dismissed SMP's criminal complaint under PD No. 957, citing the existence of a prejudicial question. This led to the suspension of the criminal action until the issue of BF Homes' liability was determined by the SEC en banc or the HLURB.

 

Ruling:  Yes, SC held the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case.  The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation, such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case.

 

Doctrine: A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 

III. Persons (Art. 37-51, New Civil Code) Cases 1-7

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs appellants,

vs. FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.

Issue: WON an action for support may be filed for an unborn child.

Facts:

i.                     Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.

ii.                   Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.

iii.                 Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action.

iv.                 Plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

Ruling: Yes, an action for support may be filed for an unborn child. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).

Doctrine:  ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if they were already born.

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

Issue: WON an unborn child acquire civil personality

Facts:

i.                     In 1948, Nita Villanueva first became acquainted with the defendant, Antonio Geluz, through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950, she conceived a child with her current husband before their legal marriage. In an attempt to conceal her pregnancy from her parents, and on her aunt's advice, she underwent an abortion performed by the defendant.

ii.                   After marrying the plaintiff, she found herself pregnant once again. Given her employment at the Commission on Elections and the inconvenience posed by her pregnancy, she sought the defendant's services for another abortion in October 1953.

iii.                 Less than two years later, she faced another pregnancy. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and Purificacion's daughter Lucida, they visited the defendant's clinic located at Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila. There, they encountered the defendant and his wife, and Nita underwent another abortion, this time of a two-month-old fetus, in exchange for fifty pesos in Philippine currency.

iv.                 The plaintiff, at the time, was campaigning for a provincial board election in Cagayan and was unaware of and did not consent to the abortion. The basis for the plaintiff's lawsuit and claim for damages stems from the third and final abortion. Upon Antonio Geluz's application, certiorari was granted.

v.                   Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court justified the award of damages, totaling P3,000.06, based on the provisions outlined in the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Ruling: No. The unborn foetus is not endowed with personality. The Court believe to be error, for Article 2206 of the Civil Code, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso[1]Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

Doctrine: The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).

 

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,

vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent

Issue: WON the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a "person"

Facts:

i.                     Pedro O. Fragante submitted an application for a certificate of public convenience to establish, operate, and maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The Public Service Commission, upon review, approved the application.

ii.                   The Commission determined that the available evidence indicated that authorizing the operation of an additional ice plant would serve the public interest and convenience appropriately.

iii.                 It was also noted that Pedro Fragante was a Filipino citizen at the time of his passing, and his intestate estate possessed the financial capability to support the proposed service.

iv.                 Consequently, the Commission directed the issuance of a certificate of public convenience to the Intestate Estate of the late Pedro Fragante.

v.                   The petitioner asserts that the commission made an error by permitting the substitution of the legal representative of Pedro O. Fragante's estate in place of the deceased as the applicant. Furthermore, it is argued that the subsequent granting of the certificate to the estate is believed to be in violation of the law.

Ruling: Yes. Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.

Doctrine: Both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution.

 

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-appellants,

vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.

 

Issue: WON Lau Yuen Yueng become a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen

Fact:

i.                     The petitioners are requesting the issuance of an injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration, restraining the Commissioner or their authorized representative from ordering the departure, arrest, deportation, and confiscation of the bond of plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung in case she fails to leave the Philippines.

 

ii.                   On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. During the questioning related to her visa application, she stated that she was a Chinese citizen residing in Kowloon, Hongkong. Her purpose for visiting the Philippines was a pleasure trip to visit her great (or grand) uncle, Lau Ching Ping, for a one-month period. She was granted entry into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, with permission to stay for one month, which would expire on April 13, 1961.

 

iii.                 Upon her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng posted a bond of P1,000.00, committing, among other things, that Lau Yuen Yeung would leave the Philippines before the expiration of her authorized stay or within a period allowed at the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration or their authorized representative. After multiple extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines until February 13, 1962.

 

iv.                 On January 25, 1962, she entered into a marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao, also known as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, who claimed to be a Filipino citizen. Due to the impending action by the respondent to confiscate her bond, order her arrest, and deport her immediately after her authorized stay had expired, she initiated this legal action, seeking an injunction with a preliminary injunction. During the hearing, which occurred one and a half years after her arrival, it was established that Lau Yuen Yeung had very limited proficiency in English or Tagalog. Apart from a few words, she was unable to converse in either language. She could not name any Filipino neighbors with Filipino names, except for one named Rosa. Additionally, she was unaware of the names of her brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law.

Ruling: Yes, The Court persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because of these possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise than as dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and practical. There can always be means of discovering such undesirable practice and every case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.

Doctrine: Lau Yuen Yeung is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen.

 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, Respondent.

Issue: WON the petitioner has validly complied with the citizenship requirement

Fact:

i.                     On December 2, 2002, Azucena initiated a Petition for Naturalization in the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur, which was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 03-001 and assigned to Branch 29 of the court.

 

ii.                   In her petition, Azucena asserted her belief in the principles of the Philippine Constitution. She claimed to have conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during her stay in the Philippines, maintaining good relations with the government and the local community. She attested to her social interactions with Filipinos and her sincere willingness to adopt their customs, traditions, and ideals. Azucena asserted that she met all the qualifications as prescribed in Section 2 and did not possess any of the disqualifications listed in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA473). She declared her non-affiliation with groups opposing organized governments or advocating violence, personal assault, or assassination for ideological purposes. Azucena affirmed that she was not a polygamist and did not endorse polygamy. She confirmed that her home country was not at war with the Philippines and expressed her genuine intention to become a Philippine citizen, renouncing any allegiance to foreign authorities. She also committed to residing continuously in the Philippines from the date of filing her Petition until her naturalization.

 

iii.                 Subsequently, after fulfilling the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 9 of CA473, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion to Dismiss based on Azucena's alleged failure to demonstrate engagement in a lawful occupation or a known lucrative trade. The RTC denied this motion, considering the grounds presented by the OSG as requiring evidentiary support. The RTC scheduled a hearing to receive Azucena's evidence on May 18, 2004.

 

iv.                 However, on the designated hearing date, neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared. Consequently, Azucena's counsel requested to present evidence ex-parte, which the RTC granted. The RTC designated its Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive Azucena's evidence during the ex-parte hearing on November 5, 2004, where again, no representative from the OSG was present despite due notice.

Ruling: Yes. Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that: "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines." Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United States which has since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative naturalization.

Doctrine: Main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family member.

 

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

 

Issue: WON Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election as provincial governor of Sorsogon

Facts:

i.                     The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon--

 

ii.                   Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine... citizenship thru repatriation;

 

iii.                 Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most... number of valid votes; or

 

iv.                 The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested... office has occurred"?

 

v.                   On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition[4] with the Comelec... docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the

Ruling:  No, Frivaldo is not a Philippine citizen. If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. However, it appears that Frivaldo has not taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

The petition is dismissed and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province.

Doctrine: In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.

 

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

 

Issue: WON the petitioner was a resident of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 8, 1995 election

 

Facts:

i.                     Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was seven (7) months.

 

ii.                   On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representative. In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

 

iii.                 On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.

 

iv.                 In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

 

Ruling: Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte. Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.

 

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

 

Doctrine: The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (oforigin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.